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ABSTRACT 
The Breakdown of Authority 
by Lars Frisell * 
This paper studies organizations with autocratic decisionmaking, i.e., where 
superiors make the decisions and subordinates either defy or submit to the 
authority. Superiors differ in the degree to which they fear defiance. The 
superiors who need obedience most face a fundamental credibility problem, 
which, in fact, makes them the least likely to be obeyed. The subordinate's 
competence has conflicting effects on the superior's welfare: competent 
subordinates comprise better sources of information but also harsher 
yardsticks. The result is that superiors prefer subordinates of "medium" 
competence. 
 
Keywords: Authority, organization theory, autocratic decision making 
JEL Classification: D20, L20 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Das Versagen der Autorität 
In der Arbeit werden Organisationen mit autokratischen Entscheidungs-
prozeduren untersucht. Bei solchen Entscheidungsprozeduren treffen Vor-
gesetzte Entscheidungen. Mitarbeiter können sich den Entscheidungen des 
Vorgesetzten unterordnen oder sich widersetzen. Die Vorgesetzten, die vom 
Gehorsam ihrer Mitarbeiter am stärksten abhängig sind, sehen sich einem 
grundlegenden Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem gegenüber, dass dazu führt, dass sie 
am wenigsten mit dem Gehorsam seitens der Mitarbeiter rechnen können. Die 
Fähigkeit eines Mitarbeiters hat einander entgegenlaufende Wirkungen auf den 
Payoff des Vorgesetzten: Mitarbeiter mit hoher Fähigkeit sind nützlicher als 
Informationsquellen, aber zugleich setzen sie strengere Maßstäbe. Vorgesetzte 
bevorzugen deshalb Mitarbeiter von "mittlerer" Fähigkeit.   
                                                 
*  I thank Jonas Vlachos for helpful comments. Financial support from the Jan Wallander and 
Tom Hedelius Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
 
 
“It should be needless to tell British seamen that no ship, whether manned by mu-
tineers or not, can be handled without discipline. If I am to command the Bounty I
mean to be obeyed. There shall be no injustice here. I shall punish no man without good
cause, but I will have no man question my authority.”
—Nordhoﬀ and Hall, Mutiny on the Bounty, p. 146.
I. Introduction
Most organizations experience times when there is no room for dialogue between
superiors and subordinates. Extreme urgency, prohibitive communication costs or large
conflicts of interest can make plain order-giving preferable to conference.1 In these
situations the organization relies on autocratic decisionmaking and information flows
primarily up-down through the hierarchy. In the terminology of Aghion and Tirole
(1997), those who possess formal authority (the right to decide) must also exercise real
authority (the eﬀective control of decisions).
The best example of an organization relying on autocratic decisionmaking is, natu-
rally, the military. The importance of swift and coordinated maneuvers in war accounts
for the strict military hierarchy, where decisionmaking involves no participation of sub-
ordinates. In turn, in organizations that rely on an eﬃcient chain of command, like
the military, the exercise of authority may become an objective in itself. The ability
to induce obedience (“leadership”) becomes a coveted quality, and career concerns may
deter superiors from using participatory methods to ensure cooperation.2
In this paper I provide a simple model of an autocratic organization. A superior
makes a decision and needs the complete cooperation from a subordinate. Upon hear-
ing the decision (“the order”), the subordinate uses his own information to determine
whether the expected outcome of the decision is suﬃciently good, if not he defies the
superior. Hence, the subordinate can not aﬀect the decision at hand, only choose not
1Strauss (1977) mentions other factors that may hinder subordinate participation in the decision-
making process. For example, that (i) subordinates are reluctant to accept responsibility, (ii) the
management culture is predominantly autocratic, (iii) subordinates diﬀer greatly in their values and
expertise (low group cohesion).
2Yukl (1981, p. 209) states that “[e]xtensive use of participation may cause a manager to be
perceived as lacking in expertise, initiative, and self-confidence. Superiors, peers, and even subordinates
may perceive the manager as a weak leader.”
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to participate.3 Although defiance should be costly for both superior and subordinate,
this paper studies situations where it is more damaging for the superior than for the
subordinate.
Autocratic decisionmaking in itself does not mean, of course, that the power of
authority is absolute. Subordinates will refuse to take actions they find highly immoral
or dangerous. Janowitz (1960) concludes that, similar to the development in civilian
organizations, the technological advances and increased specialization since the middle
of the 19th century have driven military authority to shift from ascribed (pre-assigned)
to achieved (based on performance). In other words, to induce obedience a superior
must be perceived as competent, and more so the lesser is the cost of disobedience.4
My results are as follows. I classify superiors in terms of their fear of defiance. I show
that superiors who are anxious to avoid defiance can not credibly make high-quality deci-
sions, as they are tempted to mimic their subordinate’s opinion. Importantly, superiors
are either fully trustworthy or fully unreliable, nothing in between. The superior’s util-
ity is not generally monotone in the subordinate’s informational quality, which means
that a superior may either prefer a subordinate of low, high or medium competence.
The less information the superior has on the subordinate’s opinion, i.e., the higher is
the “aloofness” in the organization, the less competent a subordinate he prefers.
This paper is closely related to Prendergast (1993) and owes much to his work. Pren-
dergast introduced a model of “yes-men”: because of subjective performance evaluation
workers tend to conform to the opinions of their superiors. In the current setting, it is
the superior who conforms to the opinion of the subordinate, in order to improve the
chances of participation. While Prendergast focuses on a trade-oﬀ between incentives
for eﬀort and honest revelation, I study the superiors’ potential credibility problem and
their choice of subordinates. Hermalin (1998) studies how a leader may credibly, and
eﬃciently, convey information to a team about the optimal level of eﬀort to put into
a project. Hermalin shows that “leading by example”, i.e., providing own eﬀort, helps
alleviating the free-riding problem in the team.
3Sometimes this “take-it-or-leave-it”-kind of negotiations may be the choice of the subordinate. As
an oﬃcial of a labor union commented, “We want management to make the decisions so we can be
free to start a grievance about it. Otherwise we could be accused of helping make bad decisions” (as
reported by Strauss, p. 354).
4Or, in Simon’s (1951) terminology, the smaller is the subordinate’s “area of acceptance”.
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In so far as I consider the possibility of delegation, this paper is also related to Aghion
and Tirole (1997) and Dessein (2002). Aghion and Tirole show that a principal often
prefers to delegate the decision to an agent despite there being a preference divergence
between the two. Dessein uses the model in Crawford and Sobel (1982) and shows that
delegation can also be preferred to communication. The proviso in both cases is that the
divergence in preferences is not too large relative to the principal’s uncertainty about
the environment. The current paper shows that a superior with credibility problems
may prefer to delegate even though the subordinate is less informed than himself.
Finally, the paper also relates to the literature on trust (for a recent overview, see
Harvey 2002). The view of the current paper, like that of Coleman (1990) and most
economists, is that trust and trustworthiness should be regarded as equilibrium phe-
nomena, not as (non-utility maximizing) modes of behavior. Contrary to the common
repeated-game result, where any level of cooperation can be sustained as an equilib-
rium, trust is here either supported in full, or breaks down completely. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
II. The Model
There are two agents, the captain of a ship (k) and his crew (c). The captain
is about to announce a decision d ∈ <, say, the route for a voyage. The crew does
not have the authority (the legal, economic, or physical possibilities) to change the
decision, but can only obey or mutiny.5 The crew is risk-neutral and obeys if the
accuracy of the captain’s decision is suﬃciently high compared to the cost of mutiny.
The captain’s utility is likewise increasing in the decision’s accuracy, but a mutiny has
more severe eﬀects for him than for the crew. For simplicity the model abstracts from
other diﬀerences in preferences, and from eﬀort provision.
The outcome of the decision depends on the state of nature ρ, which is not known
with certainty. Specifically, the captain gets a signal ρk = ρ+ k, where k is normally
distributed with zero mean and variance σ2k. The crew gets a signal ρc = ρ+c, where c
is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2c . For example, if ρ represents the
best course to take, then σ2k and σ2c reflect the agents’ navigational skills. In addition
the captain receives a signal on the crew’s signal, ρs = ρc + s, where s is normally
5All results would hold qualitatively if the crew could amend the decision, but the cost of amending
was increasing in the distance between d and the new decision.
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distributed with zero mean and variance σ2s. The latter signal represents the fact that,
even if no formal consultation takes place, by working in the same organization superiors
to some extent discover their subordinates’ information and predispositions. With which
certitude this assessment can be made (the “aloofness”) should depend on, e.g., how
frequently superior and subordinate interact.6 I assume that all signals are conditionally
independent and that all variances are positive.7
With normally distributed signals the probability that the crew obeys is inversely
related to the variance the crew ascribes to the decision. Therefor I simply represent
this probability by −V ar(d | Ic), where Ic denotes the information available to the crew.
The captain’s utility can then be modeled as
Uk = −(1− λ)V ar(d | Ik)− λE[V ar(d | Ic)],
where Ik denotes the information available to the captain, and the parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]
reflects the captain’s aversion to mutiny (relative to the crew’s). All aspects of the game
are common knowledge except the realizations of the private signals.
There are, of course, many reasons why superiors want to execute projects that
their subordinates would reject (and vice versa). Most jobs involve perks and risks
that are unequally shared by subordinates and superiors, where military enterprises
are a point in case. Managers are commonly rewarded with promotion or a financial
bonus when projects are successful, but enjoy limited liability when projects fail. Such
factors would work to increase λ in the model. I implicitly assume that the captain
cannot (completely) align interests through a contract contingent on the outcome. The
reason for this may in particular be that the “outcome”, i.e., the crew’s utility, is
not verifiable (or even observable) for third parties. Below I characterize the perfect
Bayesian equilibria of this game. It is useful to start with the two extreme cases, λ = 0
and λ = 1.
6Naturally, subordinates have information on their superiors’ opinions as well. Including this feature
would attenuate, but not eliminate, the superior’s (potential) commitment problem.
7Independence is not necessary, the important thing is that the crew has some information that
could improve on the captain’s decision.
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III. Equilibria
The confident boss (λ = 0)
If λ = 0 there is no conflict of interests between captain and crew: both want to
carry out the voyage in exactly the same circumstances. Hence, the captain will take
the decision that corresponds to his best estimate of ρ. This decision is
dC = ρkσ
2
s + ρkσ2c + ρsσ2k
σ2c + σ2k + σ2s
,
which has variance
vC = σ
2
k (σ2c + σ2s)
σ2c + σ2k + σ2s
.
The desperate boss (λ = 1)
If λ = 1 the captain fears mutiny so much that he is indiﬀerent so as to which course
is taken, as long as the crew obeys. He will therefor take the decision that minimizes
the perceived variance of ρ, given his knowledge of the crew’s opinion. The decision’s
variance conditional on the crew’s signal can be decomposed into two components: the
decision’s unconditional variance plus its squared bias relative to the crew’s expectation
of ρ. In turn, the crew forms this expectation on basis of their own signal and the decision
itself. Hence, the crew’s beliefs might be important for determining the equilibrium
decision.
Suppose the crew believes that the decision has the (unconditional) variance σ2v.
The crew’s ex post expectation of ρ is then
ρˆc =
dσ2c + ρcσ2v
σ2c + σ2v
.
The conditional variance of the captain’s decision becomes
V ar(d | ρc) = σ2v + (d− ρˆc)2 = σ2v +
σ4v
(σ2c + σ2v)
2 (d− ρc)
2 .
Now, taking σ2v as given, the conditional variance of the captain’s decision, and hence
the probability of mutiny, only depends on the distance |d− ρc| . This means that,
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regardless of which variance the crew ascribes to his decision, a desperate captain will
minimize the expectation of |d− ρc| instead of |d− ρ| . The optimal decision is
dD = ρkσ
2
s + ρsσ2c + ρsσ2k
σ2c + σ2k + σ2s
,
which has variance
vD = σ
4
c + σ2cσ2k + σ2kσ2s
σ2c + σ2k + σ2s
.
It can immediately be seen that vD > vC , i.e., the variance of a desperate captain’s
decision is higher than that of a confident one’s. Analogous to Prendergast, the cap-
tain’s desire to increase the chances of obedience leads him to compromise the accuracy
of his decision. Moreover, a rational crew will realize that the captain is distorting his
decision, and adjust their beliefs accordingly. Hence, in equilibrium, dD must also have
a lower probability of obedience than dC. A desperate captain makes both a poorer a
decision and, precisely because of this, faces a higher probability of mutiny.
PROPOSITION 1: The captain’s utility, and the probability of obedience, are
strictly lower if the equilibrium decision is dD than if it is dC .
The general case
In the proposition below I show that for general values of λ, in a pure equilibrium the
decision is always either dC or dD. Hence, there is no continuous shift from dC towards
dD as λ is increased.8 Roughly expressed, the preference for accurate decisions and the
preference for obedience per se are mutually exclusive concerns, and at some point the
latter will dominate the former. At this point the captain loses “all” credibility, and
his chances of being obeyed drop abruptly. With rational individuals, credibility or
trustworthiness is an equilibrium phenomenon: either a person benefits from honoring
trust, in which case it will be confided to him, or he profits more from betraying it, and
he shall have none.
8Importantly, this is not a result of the additive utility function. For example, it holds for a
multiplicative specification of the kind Uk = −V ar(d | Ik)α ∗E[V ar(d | Ic)1−α]. Briefly, the (omitted)
proof shows that the expression is convex in d.
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When lambda is close to 0, dC is the unique equilibrium, and when λ is close to 1,
dD is the unique equilibrium. For intermediate values of λ both equilibria are possible,
and the equilibrium decision must be jointly determined with the crew’s beliefs. These
findings are summarized in Proposition 2 and illustrated in Figure 1.
Definitions:
λ0 = (σ
2
k+σ2c)
2
(σ2s+2σ2c)
2
4σ2sσ6c+6σ4kσ2cσ2s+σ4cσ4s+2σ2cσ4sσ2k+2σ4kσ4s+5σ4cσ4k+5σ8c+10σ2kσ2sσ4c+10σ2kσ6c
.
λ00 = (σ
2
sσ2k+σ2sσ2c+2σ2cσ2k+σ4c)
2
(σ8c+4σ2kσ6c+2σ6cσ2s+2σ2kσ2cσ4s+6σ2kσ4cσ2s+6σ4kσ2cσ2s+5σ4kσ4c+2σ4kσ4s+σ4cσ4s)
.
PROPOSITION 2: 0 < λ0 < λ00 < 1. For λ < λ0, dC is the unique equilibrium, for
λ > λ00, dD is the unique equilibrium, and for λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ00 both equilibria are possible.
Figure 1. Equilibrium decisions as a function of λ (σk² = 1, σc² = 2, σs² = 1).
10.9310.821
dD uniquedC unique Both equilibriapossible
λ
When λ ∈ [λ0, λ00] both pure equilibria (and one mixed) are possible. In particular, if
the crew is confident that the captain makes decision dC, this is also the captain’s best
response. Since the “confident equilibrium” is preferred by both parties, the existence
of multiple equilibria constitutes a pure coordination problem, which could be resolved
by cheap talk. (The captain could add a speech to his order saying “trust me to make
decision dC ”, which the crew should.) Hence, in the absence of other factors explaining
why the crew should expect decision dD, it is natural to regard dC as the outcome in
the whole range [0, λ00]. For this reason, and for brevity, the comparative statics below
focuses on dC being the equilibrium.
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IV. The choice of subordinates
It is straightforward to show that a lower σ2k and a lower σ2s both increase the utility
of equilibrium dC , and increase the range of λ for which it is sustainable. Hence, if we
originally are in a situation where λ ≤ λ00, improving the captain’s knowledge of the
crew’s opinion or increasing the captain’s competence unambiguously increases welfare.9
However, this is not true for the crew’s competence.
When the captain has an interest in obedience per se, the crew’s information has
conflicting eﬀects on his welfare: it serves as a source of information via ρs but also
serves as yardstick by which his decision is evaluated. A lower σ2c is beneficial in so
far as it decreases the variance of the decision, but is detrimental as it increases the
expected diﬀerence between d and ρˆc, for a more competent crew will put more weight
on their own signal when forming their expectation of ρ. Generally, when σ2s and λ
are low the “information eﬀect” dominates, in the opposite case the “yardstick” eﬀect
dominates. In particular, if λ is very close to λ00, an increase in the subordinate’s
competence causes the dC-equilibrium to disappear, which drastically reduces welfare.
For intermediate cases the captain’s utility is non-monotone in σ2c , so that the captain
prefers a crew of “medium” quality.
σc² 21.510.50
-0.8
-0.9
-1
-1.1
λ = 0.2
λ = 0.6
λ = 0.4
Figure 2: Uk as a function of σ2c , for diﬀerent values of λ (σ2k = 1, σ2s = 2).
9This suggests that aloofness in organizations can not be motivated by purely informational reasons,
only its eﬀect on eﬀort provision (cf. Prendergast and Crémer 1995). However, when the equilibrium
is dD, a decrease in σ2s may decrease welfare. Similar to Prendergast, if σ2k < σ2c , less aloofness is
detrimental because it improves the captain’s ability to mimic a poor signal.
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PROPOSITION 3: When λ is small (large) the captain’s utility is decreasing (in-
creasing) in σ2c . For intermediate values of λ , the σ2c that maximizes the captain’s utility
is interior.
The optimal σ2c depends crucially on the aloofness parameter σ2s, since this deter-
mines to which extent the captain can make use of the crew’s information. Higher
aloofness always increases the optimal σ2c , for it reduces the crew’s informational con-
tribution without aﬀecting the precision of their “yardstick”.
PROPOSITION 4: The captain’s preferred σ2c is (weakly) increasing in σ2s.
Delegation
Naturally, if consultation with subordinates is impossible because of their reluctance
to take on responsibility, or the superior’s concern for displaying “strong leadership”,
delegation of the whole decision responsibility should be unthinkable. However, if au-
tocratic decisionmaking is solely the result of urgency or a too broad span of control,
delegation may be a viable alternative. In the current setting, delegation would mean
that the crew gets to choose between making decision ρc (which has variance σ2c), and
committing mutiny.
Similar to Aghion and Tirole, delegation would often be preferred when subordinates
are better informed than their superiors. If σ2c < σ2k and σ2s is high — which is almost
synonymous with a broad span of control — the captain can not make much use of
the crew’s information so the crew probably makes the better decision. However, for
captains with credibility problems, i.e., when dD is the equilibrium, autocracy may
actually be so ineﬀective that the captain would prefer to delegate even though σ2c > σ2k.
This means that the lack of power to commit to high-quality decisions on behalf of
superiors can lead to increased delegation. In Figure 3 the captain’s utility under
autocracy is compared to the variance of the crew’s signal. Note that −σ2c is larger
than Uk until σ2c equals about one and a half, although σ2k is just one.
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1.751.51.2510.75
-0.75
-1
-1.25
-1.5
-1.75
-2
σc²45°
Figure 3: Uk as a function of σ2c (σ2k = 1, σ2s = 2, λ = 0.95).
V. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to study organizations under autocracy, i.e.,
situations where superiors make the decisions and subordinates either defy or submit
to authority. The analysis focuses on superiors who “fear defiance”, that is, superiors
who at least on the margin are willing to compromise the quality of the decision to get
their orders carried out.
I have couched the model in terms of a captain commanding his crew. The prospect
of mutiny is, surely, something worth compromising a captain’s integrity for. However,
the phenomenon should arise whenever authorities have an interest in obedience per
se, be it because of career concerns (an oﬃcer suspected of being a “weak leader”),
financial gain (a manager facing small downward risk), or psychological reasons (a tired
parent). I show that those superiors who are most anxious to avoid defiance can not
credibly make high-quality decisions, as they are too tempted to make their decisions
“appear” accurate. The result is that, ironically, these superiors are the least likely to
be obeyed.
The superior’s chances of achieving obedience, i.e., his “authority” or “trustworthi-
ness”, do not change gradually with her fear of defiance. Instead, authority remains
intact until a certain point, where it collapses. I think this is how most people think
about submission or trust: it is given and honored in its entirety, or not at all. It is hard
to imagine such things as “partial trust” or a “somewhat trustworthy” person. Often
superiors prefer to have subordinates who are neither very well-informed, nor very un-
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informed. Poorly informed subordinates contribute little to the decision’s quality, but
well-informed subordinates are more likely to think the superior has made a poor deci-
sion. One empirical implication is that the higher is the aloofness in an organization,
that is, the less superiors and subordinates interact, the less competent subordinates
we should expect.
The model is incomplete in many respects. To focus on the relationship between
superior and subordinate I ignore team aspects, eﬀectively by modeling the crew as
a singular agent, and to focus on informational aspects I abstract from eﬀort provi-
sion. The most fruitful extension however, I think, would be to model the authority
relationship as a dynamic game, where the superior’s “career concerns” are endogenous.
More striking for non-economists is probably the overly simplistic, “rational” way I
portray the authority relationship: the subordinate estimates the expected outcome of
the decision, and, mechanically, obeys or disobeys depending on this estimate. Anybody
familiar with Milgram’s experiments on obedience knows that the mere act of defiance
was often suﬃcient to deter it — despite that the subjects “knew” that their actions
implied extreme danger for another person. Milgram (1974) explained that the subject,
in her mind, reduced herself to the experimenter’s “agent”, thus freeing herself of the
responsibility of her actions. I think that, in line with other experiments in psychology,
in addition to renouncing the responsibility of their actions, subordinates often disown
their ability to assess their consequences. In autocratic organizations, this kind of
subordinates should be high in demand.
APPENDIX
Denote the expected squared bias of dC and dD w.r.t. ρc, respectively,
bC = σ
2
kσ2s + σ2cσ2s + σ4c
(σ2c + σ2k + σ2s)
,
and
bD = (σ
2
k + σ2c)σ2s
(σ2c + σ2k + σ2s)
.
Note that bC > bD, i.e., dD is indeed a better estimator of ρc than is dC .
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
For the sake of argument, suppose both equilibria exist for the same set parameters.
The captain’s utility when the equilibrium decision is vC and vD would be, respectively,
−vC − λ
¡
vC
¢2
(vC + ρc)
2 b
C (A1)
and
−vD − λ
¡
vD
¢2
(vD + ρc)
2 b
D. (A2)
Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that (A1) < (A2) for some set of parameters.
Then, since vC < vD, this must also hold when λ = 1. Setting λ to 1 and using the
above definitions gives that the diﬀerence (A1) - (A2) equals
σ6c (4σ10c + 16σ2kσ8c + 9σ8cσ2s + 5σ2kσ2cσ6s + 33σ2kσ6cσ2s + 12σ4kσ6c + 4σ4kσ6s + σ4cσ6s)
(2σ2kσ2c + σ2kσ2s + σ2cσ2s + σ4c)
¡
σ2k + σ2y
¢
(2σ2c + σ2s)
+
σ6c(6σ6cσ4s + 22σ2kσ2cσ4s + 17σ4kσ2cσ4s + 24σ4kσ4cσ2s)
(2σ2kσ2c + σ2kσ2s + σ2cσ2s + σ4c)
¡
σ2k + σ2y
¢
(2σ2c + σ2s)
> 0,
a contradiction.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Without loss of generality, suppose that the captain’s decision is a convex combina-
tion of dC and dD. Denote the weight he puts on dC and dD, a and (1−a), respectively.
Given the crew’s beliefs, σ2v, the captain maximizes:
−(1− λ)adC − (1− λ)(1− a)dD − λσ2v − λ
σ4v
(σ2c + σ2v)
2 (ab
C + (1− a)bD) (A3)
The expression is clearly linear in a. Hence, except for knife-edge cases, a = 1 or a = 0
is the unique solution to the captain’s problem. Suppose first that the crew’s belief is
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that a = 0, so that σ2v = vD. If the captain indeed sets a = 0, (A3) becomes (A2). If
the captain instead would set a = 1, (A3) becomes
−vC − λ (v
D)2
(σ2c + vD)
2 b
C . (A4)
vD is an equilibrium as long as (A2) - (A4) > 0. This diﬀerence is
σ4c
(σ2c + σ2k + σ2s)
−
λσ4c
4σ2sσ6c + 6σ4kσ2cσ2s + σ4cσ4s + 2σ2cσ4sσ2k + 2σ4kσ4s + 5σ4cσ2k + 5σ8c + 10σ2kσ2sσ4c + 10σ2kσ6c
(2σ2kσ2c + σ2kσ2s + σ2cσ2s + 2σ4c)
2
(σ2c + σ2k + σ2s)
,
which is strictly decreasing in λ. Setting (A2) = (A4) gives that vD is an equilibrium
as long as λ ≥ λ0. Suppose instead that the crew believes that the captain sets a = 1.
Doing so gives the captain utility (A1), while “deviating” to a = 0 gives
−vD − λ (v
C)2
(σ2c + vC)
2 b
D (A5)
Using the definitions above gives that (A1) > (A5) as long as λ ≤ λ00. Finally, it can be
immediately seen that λ0, λ00 ∈ (0, 1). Also, the diﬀerence λ00− λ0 is positive (expression
omitted).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
I first show that λ00 is strictly increasing in σ2c . Hence, by Proposition 2, at λ = λ00
a marginal decrease in σ2c will shift the equilibrium from dC to dD. By Proposition 1
and continuity, this means that the captain’s utility is strictly increasing in σ2c at λ00.
Second, I show that the captain’s utility is strictly decreasing in σ2c at λ = 0. Third, I
show that for σ2s suﬃciently low, the utility of decision dC is strictly decreasing in σ2c .
This holds in particular in a neighborhood around λ00, which means that for suﬃciently
low σ2s, the captain’s utility is non-monotone in σ2c .
(i) Diﬀerentiating λ00 w.r.t. σ2c gives
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2 (σ2kσ2c + σ4s + 2σ2cσ2s + σ4c) (2σ2kσ2c + σ2kσ2s + σ2cσ2s + σ4c) (σ2c + σ2s)σ4k
(σ8c + 4σ2kσ6c + 2σ6cσ2s + 2σ2kσ2cσ4s + 6σ2kσ4cσ2s + 6σ4kσ2cσ2s + 5σ4kσ4c + 2σ4kσ4s + σ4cσ4s)
2 > 0.
(ii) Diﬀerentiating (A1) w.r.t. σ2c and evaluating at λ = 0 gives
− σ
2
k
(σ2c + σ2k + σ2s)
2 < 0.
(iii) Diﬀerentiating (A1) w.r.t. σ2c and evaluating at λ = λ00 and z = 0 gives
σ6k
25σ6k + 8σ6c + 35σ2kσ4c + 50σ4kσ2c
(σ4c + 4σ2kσ2c + 5σ4k)
2
(σ2k + σ2c)
2 > 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Diﬀerentiating (A1) w.r.t. σ2c and σ2s gives
−2 σ
4
k
(σ2c + σ2k + σ2s)
3 + λM, (A6)
where M is a positive expression, omitted for brevity. Suppose, contrary to the propo-
sition, that (A6) is positive. Then this must also hold at λ00, the highest value of λ for
which dC is an equilibrium. Evaluating (A6) at λ00 gives an (omitted) expression that
is negative, a contradiction.
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